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1 Introduction 
The role of the informal sector in the process of economic development was quite a 
popular question throughout the 1970s when, among others, the International Labour 
Office (ILO) started to undertake studies focused specifically on this segment of the 
labour market (ILO 1972). Given the current focus of international development policy 
on pro-poor growth and poverty reduction – and given the fact, that the informal sector 
is generally being considered as the economy of the poor – this topic is again on the top 
of the research and policy agenda. A key question is if pro-poor growth policies have to 
address the informal sector specifically and in any particular way or if the informal 
sector evolves like the rest of the economy and that therefore good growth policies are 
also good informal sector policies. 
To answer these questions two issues are of crucial importance. First, what are the 
linkages – in quality and magnitude – between the informal sector and the rest of the 
economy, i.e., the agricultural sector and the formal sector? Second, and this is linked to 
the first question, what is the perspective which we see in the informal sector? More 
precisely, do we see the informal sector as a source of growth and do we want to keep it 
with all its characteristics, or, do we sight its transformation to the formal sector. 
Whereas the first question is clearly of a positive nature the second one is to a large 
extent normative. 
Here, we focus on the first question and limit our analysis to linkages in the urban 
economy and between the informal and the formal sector. In our empirical part we 
examine Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003. Burkina Faso is one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Real GNI per capita was estimated at US$220 in 2002, on the 
basis of its Human Development Index, the country was ranked 164
th out of 168 
countries (UNDP 2003) and poverty measured by the headcount index was 47.2 per cent 
in rural areas and 20.3 per cent in urban areas in 2003 (Grimm and Günther 2004). 
Although Burkina Faso knew considerable economic growth throughout the 1990s and 
with a rather moderate increase of the urban population of 2 percentage points between 
1994 and 2003, Burkina Faso had to support a strong increase in urban poverty which 
was mainly caused by a stagnation – and in some cases a decrease – in real earnings 
across all sectors. The question is if we can explain this development with the 
interrelationship that exists between informal and formal sector earnings. In the nineties 
Burkina Faso knew a real devaluation of the CFA Franc by 50 per cent relative to the 
French Franc. In addition the country implemented several structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP). Both shocks led ‘on-impact’ to a substantive decline of real formal 
earnings in the urban economy, which might in return have had a severe negative 
impact on informal sector earnings. 
We think that linkages between the formal and informal sector can exist on a macro 
(market) as well as on a micro (household) level and that these two levels can also be 
interlinked. How formal and informal sector earnings are linked on the macro and micro 
level as well as between the two levels can be determined by both the product market as 
well as the factor market. In a first step, we analyze if and to what magnitude formal 
and informal sector earnings are linked on a macro level by looking at inter-household 
linkages. In a second step, we then consider intra-household linkages. In each case we 
focus only on urban areas and use households as an observation unit, which to our 
knowledge has only rarely been done in the literature. However, we argue that these 
inter- and intra-household linkages are of particular importance for the understanding of   2
formal-informal linkages and especially when addressing issues of pro-poor growth and 
poverty reduction. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on 
linkages between the formal and informal sector in developing economies and based on 
this develop some research hypotheses. In Section 3, we provide a short overview of the 
Burkinabè context. In Section 4, we present our data sources. In Section 5, we analyze 
empirically the linkages between the formal and informal economy on two levels: 
between and within households. In Section 6, we conclude and draw some policy 
implications with respect to pro-poor growth. 
2  Linkages between the formal and informal sector 
If we want to analyse the linkages between the informal and formal sector we first need 
to provide a more or less clear-cut definition of the informal sector, which separates it 
from the formal economy. Maybe the broadest definition of the informal sector is to say 
that it covers all economic activities which cannot be classified under the organizational 
standards of the industrialized countries (Hemmer and Mannel 1989). And probably one 
of the most detailed definitions is the one of the ILO Kenya report from 1972 (ILO 
1972), which comprises seven criteria. According to this report, the informal sector is 
any family owned small scale economic activity in very competitive markets, being 
very labour intensive, using skills acquired outside the formal school system and relying 
on indigenous resources. It is also characterized by ease of entry and falls under no 
governmental regulations, such as minimum wage or tax laws. In what follows it is 
however sufficient to keep in mind the first and rather broad classification. In our 
empirical part, we then retain a closer and relatively pragmatic definition.  
The very first literature about the informal sector was primarily concerned with theories 
on its origin and empirical analyses of its status quo, with both theoretical as well as 
empirical writings looking at the informal sector as an isolated segment of the economy. 
But soon the importance of the nature of linkages between the informal and formal 
sector and a call for an integrated framework, for both an understanding of the informal 
sector and for effective policy recommendations, was emphasized by several authors 
(see e.g., Tokman 1978; Stark 1982; Hemmer and Mannel 1989; Harriss 1990; Lachaud 
1990; Xaba et al. 2002). However, although many authors have written on the 
theoretical linkages which might exist, surprisingly little empirical analysis so far exists 
on those linkages. In this section we begin with a review of literature on the linkages 
between the informal and formal sector and how the understanding of the concept of 
interaction has changed over time. Based on this, we then develop our linkages 
framework. 
The theoretical concept of the informal sector can be seen as an expansion of the dual 
economy or dichotomy literature originating in Lewis (1954) and Todaro (1969), with 
the informal sector traditionally being considered as the ‘residual sector’ of a segmented 
urban market (e.g., Fields 1974 or Mazumdar 1976). The reasons given for this dualism 
or segmentation of urban labour markets, with apparently homogenous workers being 
paid different wages depending on the sector of the economy in which they are 
employed, basically fall into two explanatory categories, institutional and market (e.g., 
Stiglitz 1974) explanations, of which the former dominates most writings and 
discussions (Charmes 1990). As a result, for a long time empirical research on the   3
informal sector, with the ILO Kenya mission report of 1972 (ILO 1972) probably being 
the first prominent one, has focused on static comparisons of earnings differentials 
(Maloney 1997), which tended to support the theory of segmented labour markets.  
The only relationship between the formal and informal sector which is generally 
described in this very early literature is a top-down (formal to informal) relationship 
within the labour market. The usual assumption being made is that formal sector size 
and wages are exogenously fixed and that a function of both determine the extent of 
rural-urban migration. Informal sector size is then defined as the labour surplus, which 
cannot be absorbed by the urban formal economy (Fields 1974). Hence the size of the 
informal sector expands with the size (and wages) of the formal sector. But given that 
informal sector income is shared among an ‘ever-growing’ informal sector labour force 
competing in the same market, this leads to ever-diminishing informal sector earnings 
(Mazumdar 1976). Besides this relationship, sector dichotomy is assumed, with the 
informal sector being a more or less autonomous segment, with little linkages to the rest 
of the economy. 
Evidently, this also means that most of the time, these early writings assume strict 
dualism in the product market (Livingstone 1971; Harriss 1990), where the formal and 
informal sector produce and offer similar goods but at different price levels, serving 
different markets; segmented by different income categories. With the demand for 
informal products mainly coming from the informal sector, one of the reasons given for 
the low potential of the informal sector is then its poor ‘informal’ customer base 
(Harriss 1990). 
However, today there seems to be broad consensus, that the informal and formal 
product markets are densely interlinked on various levels. A useful framework for 
analysis seems to be the distinction between complementary, competitive and 
indifferent markets (Van Dijk 1980) on the one hand and between final product and 
intermediate product markets (see e.g., Harriss 1990) or forward and backward linkages 
(see e.g., Xaba et al. 2002) on the other hand. A good example for complementary 
markets is commercial sub-contracting, where the informal sector is selling products of 
the formal sector. Competitive markets occur in the case where the two sectors compete 
within the same product market and their respective market share being determined by 
sector product prices (see e.g., Hemmer and Mannel 1989) and/or real sector wages (see 
e.g., Cogneau et al. 1996). Last, markets might neither be complementary nor 
competitive (Sethuraman 1997), with the two sectors co-existing in different product 
markets (but with an overlapping formal-informal customer base). The intermediate 
input market, generally, constitutes any backward linkages whereas the final product 
market in most cases comprises any forward linkages between the two sectors.  
For the case of sub-Saharan Africa there seem to be strong inter-linkages in the final 
product market, with both sectors being a strong supply as well as demand base of the 
other sector (see e.g., Xaban et al. 2002; Charmes 1996), with rising wages leading to 
lower propensity to consume informal sector goods (Lachaud 1990). However, whereas 
forward linkages (i.e. markets beyond the borders of the respective sectors) are strong 
for both sectors, backward linkages (i.e. inputs from beyond the respective sectors) only 
seem to be significant from the informal to the formal sector but are of little importance 
from the formal to the informal sector (Harriss 1990). Hence an asymmetry of 
relationship between the two sectors seems to exist on the intermediate African product 
market (Hugon 1990), where the informal sector buys many of its input from the formal   4
sector, but where a close interconnection between small informal production units and 
formal enterprises is almost not existent. Or put differently, linkages on the African 
product market seem to be very strong between formal and informal households on the 
final product market but rather weak and unequal between formal and informal 
enterprises on the intermediate product market.  
With this new understanding of the linkages on the product market also a new light is 
shed on the relationship between formal and informal sector labour markets. The 
traditional view suggests that informal sector employment, absorbing rural-urban 
migration surplus and off-setting economic shocks, would show a counter-cyclical 
pattern, i.e. expanding in size in economic downturns and contracting in economic up-
swings, with average informal earnings being a function of informal sector size with a 
negative elasticity coefficient (Charmes 1990). Also, earlier writings, which at least 
partly explain the existence of the informal sector as a result of institutions setting 
formal wages above market clearing prices, would support the argument that higher 
formal wages, everything else kept constant, generally leads to a larger informal sector, 
with lower informal wages. However, taking both the complementary as well as 
competitive forward and backward product linkages into account, the described 
phenomena need not necessarily be true, with the direction of the economic impact of 
formal sector size and earnings on the informal sector remaining uncertain. In fact, 
Maloney (2004) shows, that informal sector size, depending on the country studied, 
might react both pro- as well as anti-cyclical, with average informal earnings 
diminishing or growing independent of the evolution of informal sector size (see also 
Livingstone 1971). 
In addition, recent empirical evidence of urban labour markets in developing countries 
has also contradicted the traditional concepts of the informal sector and hence also its 
relationship to the formal sector. The most important criticism of earlier studies is that 
the heterogeneity of the informal sector is not appropriately taken into account. 
Earnings of informal sector workers are lower on average than earnings in the formal 
sector, but not uniformly so and considerable overlap of the two distributions exist. 
Charmes (1990) therefore distinguishes between the low wage or ‘lower-tiers’ and high 
wage or ‘upper-tiers’ informal sector. This distinction is partly correlated with the 
‘involuntary entry’ and ‘voluntary entry’ informal sector concept of Maloney (2004) 
and partly with the primary and secondary (to a main job in the formal sector or in 
relation to the structure of household income) informal activity concept mentioned by 
Lachaud (1990). This heterogeneity does not only explain the higher variation of 
informal sector earnings but might also mean that the various informal sector sub-
groups are linked to the formal sector quite differently (see Blunch et al. 2001 and 
Charmes 1996), with the aggregated direction and magnitude of the relationship 
unknown. 
Second, until today most of the empirical work about the nature of the informal sector 
as well as about its inter-linkages with the formal sector used enterprises or individuals 
as the unit of observation. However as Lachaud (1990) states, in the context of sub-
Saharan Africa, where most social systems are organized around households, 
households would be a much more useful unit of observation to understand the 
functioning of urban labour markets. Many households in LDCs are engaged in both the 
formal and informal sector (Blunch et al. 2001) and the sector of employment of the 
household head might have a high influence on the labour supply and sector choice of 
other household members (see Lachaud 1990 and Pradhan and Soest 1997). However,   5
even more important than household decisions concerning collective labour supply is 
the household as an observation unit for standards of living. Charmes (1990), for 
instance, emphasizes the importance of intra-household transfers. For the case of West-
Africa, Azam (2004) finds some evidence for high investments of formal sector 
employees into informal enterprises. He also claims that on average 40 people are 
supported by one formal sector income. Hence, given that labour supply decisions and 
the generation of income by individuals happen within their respective households and 
simultaneously with the decisions of other household members, the notion of 
‘dichotomy’ between the formal and informal sector loses some of its significance and 
the value of an assessment of the relationship between the informal and formal sector 
based on an analysis of individuals or enterprise surveys becomes questionable 
(Lachaud 1990). 
Our hypotheses is, that urban informal and formal sector earnings are linked on a macro 
(market) level as well as on a micro (household) level and that these levels are also 
interlinked. The observed linkage coefficient (which might be positive or negative in 
total) might be determined by the (final and input) product and (labour and capital) 
factor market. However, in this study we only focus on analysing if and to what 
magnitude informal and formal labour earnings and supply are linked on a macro as 
well as on a micro level. We then give an interpretation what the drivers behind these 
linkages might be, but leave a more detailed empirical analysis of those drivers for a 
second study. Given our primary interest in poverty reduction and pro-poor growth (and 
not only individual earnings growth) we argue that households and not enterprises or 
individuals should be used as an observation unit for both the macro- as well as the 
micro level and hence analyse inter- as well as intra-household linkages. 
3  The economic context in Burkina Faso 
3.1  Macroeconomic growth and urban poverty 
Macroeconomic data suggests that over the last decade Burkina Faso knew relatively 
strong growth and a good macroeconomic performance. Real GDP per capita began to 
rise after the devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994 and averaged 2 per cent per 
year between 1994 and 2003 (IAP 2004).1 Since 1991, in the framework of stabilization 
and structural adjustment programmes (SAP), the country has implemented a wide 
range of economic reforms, including a price and trade liberalization. The country then 
established its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in May 2000 (Ministère 
de l’Economie et des Finances 2000), reaching its completion point in the HIPC II 
Initiative in April 2002. As a mainly agricultural and cotton exporting country, Burkina 
Faso’s economic performance depends heavily on climatic conditions and the world 
market price for cotton. During the last ten years those parameters were, except for 
some years, rather favourable and in connection with the devaluation growth mainly 
arose from agriculture and especially cotton exports.  
                                                 
1  IAP stands for ‘Instrument Automatisé de Prévision’. It is a macroeconomic consistency framework 
based on National Accounts data developed by the Burkinabè Ministry of Economy and Development 
with technical assistance of the German ‘Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit’ (GTZ). For 
details see Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances (1997).   6
However, whereas one can observe considerable economic growth rates for rural areas, 
the urban population has not sufficiently participated in the Burkinabè growth process; 
at least not the years following the devaluation. In contrast, it seems that the urban 
population had to take a large part of the burden connected to the devaluation and 
structural adjustment via stagnating and in some cases declining real earnings. 
According to our estimates, the urban poverty headcount index increased substantively 
between 1994 and 1998 from 14.7 per cent to 27.3 per cent2 before declining to 20.3 per 
cent in 2003. The increasing urban poverty is certainly of concern, since, as in most 
West-African countries, the urban economy has become more and more important: 
population census data indicates that the urbanization rate increased between 1978 and 
1985 from 6.4 per cent to 12.7 per cent and then between 1985 and 1996 to 15.5 per 
cent (INSD 2000). The phenomenon of an ‘urbanization of poverty’ is however not 
specific to the Burkinabè case. There is important empirical evidence for other African 
countries as well; especially for those which also had to support the devaluation of the 
CFA Franc in 1994 (see e.g., Haddad et al. 1999; Grimm et al. 2002; Azam 2004).  
Given the objective of this study, it is now worthwhile to look in more detail at the 
effects of the devaluation and the structural adjustment process on the urban labour 
market. 
3.2  Macroeconomic shocks, policy reform and the urban labour market 
The devaluation in 1994 increased the level of foreign prices measured in CFA Francs 
and thus the prices of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods. The resulting effect 
on aggregate growth was without doubt significantly positive. In particular, exports of 
cotton increased after the devaluation given the gain in competitiveness. However, the 
impact of the devaluation on other export products was rather small, even if some 
exporting formal enterprises benefited from better terms of trade while keeping nominal 
wages more or less constant. In urban areas the devaluation led, at least in the short and 
medium term, to a decrease of real earnings since prices of imported goods increased 
and wages (public and private formal) were not indexed to inflation. This had positive 
and negative repercussions on the informal economy. On the one hand households of 
the formal sector substituted to a certain extent imported goods with informal goods, but 
on the other hand, had to reduce their total demand for informal goods given their lower 
real wages. A massive destruction of urban formal employment following the SAP 
cannot be observed (see Table 1), among other things, because privatizations were 
counterbalanced by large public investment programmes and recruitment of public 
employees in social sectors (Konaté and Raffinot 1998).  
For urban Burkina Faso we find empirical evidence (see Tables 1 and 2) that stagnating 
and in some cases decreasing real earnings in all sectors, but especially in the formal 
private sector, pushed formerly inactive household members into the labour market, 
trying to maintain initial household income levels.3 Accordingly, the average 
                                                 
2  This massive increase in poverty in 1998 was also partly driven by the severe drought which Burkina 
Faso had to support in 1997/1998. 
3  Table 2 shows that one finds a quite different evolution whether we consider the evolution of average 
earnings or median earnings. Part of this difference is linked to measurement error especially in the upper   7
dependency ratio within households decreased. Higher labour market participation has 
most likely further lowered (and particular informal) wages and also resulted in a rise of 
unemployment. Increased labour supply was however not sufficient to maintain urban 
household incomes per capita at their level of 1994. In consequence for all socio-
economic groups poverty increased. However, urban poverty still mainly concerns the 
informal sector (see Table 2), which accounts for more than 30 per cent of total GDP 
and employs around 70 per cent of the total urban work force (Grimm and Günther 
2004). During the same time working conditions worsened for many employees, e.g., a 
much higher proportion of the labour force is now confronted with short term working 
agreements (see Table 1). 
All these changes suggest that there are substantial interactions between the formal and 
informal economy, especially on the labour market. These interactions will be analyzed 
and discussed in Section 5 after having presented our data sources.  
4 Data  sources 
We use three household surveys, all undertaken by the Institut National de la Statistique 
et de la Démographie (INSD) with financial and technical assistance of the World Bank 
within the last 10 years, namely in 1994 (EPI) 1998 (EPII) and 2003 (EPIII). The 
respective sample sizes are 8642 (of whom 2718 urban households), 8478 (2593) and 
8500 (2600) households. These surveys contain socio-economic information about 
households and their members, data on employment, wages, agricultural and non-
agricultural activity and profits, housing, expenditures, and about some assets possessed 
by the households. Some problems arise because the three surveys have not been 
undertaken during the same season reducing the comparability of expenditure data, 
especially for agricultural households, but less so for urban households. Furthermore, 
the questionnaires have slightly been modified from one survey to the other by reducing 
the recall period from 30 days to 15 days for food items and by applying a higher 
disaggregation for some expenditure categories. According to empirical evidence of 
other countries, the first bias will most likely result in lower expenditures in 1998 and 
2003, compared to 1994. The shorter recall period in 1998 and 2003 will however result 
in rather higher declared expenditures in 1998 and 2003 compared to 1994, thus 
generating a bias in the opposite direction. Finally the higher disaggregation will most 
likely also lead to higher reported expenditure in 1998 and 2003 with respect to 1994. 
These problems are in detail analysed and discussed in Grimm and Günther (2004). 
However, given that our concern is not to provide a poverty assessment over the whole 
period, but instead to examine linkages between the formal and informal economy, 
these problems are of less importance for this study. 
More important is the fact, that wages and profits have not been declared by all 
occupied individuals and that they are most likely affected by higher measurement error 
than household expenditures. Furthermore, whereas the used recall period for household 
income was 12 months in 1994 and 1998, it was only 30 days in 2003. Therefore we 
have to be careful when relying with our interpretations on these data sources. The used 
expenditure aggregate excludes expenditures for durables, but includes self-
                                                                                                                                               
tail of the earnings distribution in 1994, but it seems also likely that especially some of the employees in 
the higher earnings segment had to support substantive cuts in their real wages.   8
consumption, made transfers and imputed rents for those who own their housing. To 
compare expenditures and earnings over several years, they are deflated by regional and 
temporal price changes, for details see again Grimm and Günther (2004).  
In order to identify workers in the informal sector we proceeded in three steps. First, we 
limit the potentially active population to individuals older than 14 years. This seems a 
quite reasonable and practical assumption for urban areas. Children below that age 
working from time to time or even regularly present a very heterogeneous group. The 
inclusion of children in our study would mix our research focus with issues regarding 
child work. Second, we determine occupation status – occupied, unemployed (self-
declared), student and inactive – by using the corresponding questions in the surveys. 
Third, we determine for the occupied individuals the type of activity they carry out. We 
distinguish: wage earners in the public sector, wage earners in the private formal sector, 
informal workers, individuals working as family help and other non-remunerated 
workers and trainees. The last two groups can, to a large extent, be seen as a sub-group 
of the informal sector. Whether somebody works in the public sector or as a family 
helper, trainee or non-remunerated worker is directly observed in all three surveys. To 
separate wage earners in the private formal sector from informal workers we proceeded 
as follows. In 1994 and 1998, we classify declared ‘wage earners in the private sector’ 
as ‘wage earners in the private formal sector’ and declared ‘independent workers’ and 
‘employers’ as ‘informal workers’. Of course the risk is here to classify informal 
dependent workers as formal workers and, vice versa, formal employers as informal 
workers. We checked our classification using information on social security, labour 
contracts and the existence of firms and non-farm profits in the concerned households. It 
turns out that our procedure works quite well and that there should be only a few miss-
classifications. For 2003 we know if the employer of an occupied person is a private 
enterprise or a single individual or household. In addition we know if this individual is a 
white collar, skilled blue collar or unskilled blue collar worker or an independent 
worker. To achieve consistency with 1994 and 1998 we define ‘independent working 
individuals’ in ‘private firms’ or ‘households’ as ‘informal workers’. The residual is 
defined as ‘wage earners in the formal sector’. 
In some of our analyses we work with individual earnings in other cases we work with 
household income. To limit the effect of measurement error in household incomes and 
to achieve consistency with household expenditures, we use the structure of income by 
source (agricultural, public, formal, informal, transfers and other) and compute the 
nominal household income components by source by multiplying these shares with total 
household expenditures (excluding auto-consumption). This procedure will provide 
satisfying results, if the measurement error over the different income sources is 
proportional to the corresponding income level, i.e. if the income level is biased, but not 
the income structure. Of course we have to assume that savings are quite unimportant 
for most of the population, which is however a reasonable assumption in the Burkinabè 
context. 
Unfortunately our data is not panel data, so if we want to analyze inter-temporal 
developments the lowest disaggregation level is constituted by regions (10 in total).4 
The provinces level cannot be used for inter-temporal comparisons, because the divide 
                                                 
4  In 2003 the number of regions was increased to 13 regions, but it is possible to recover the former 
divide into 10 regions, therefore we work in the dynamic analysis with 10 regions.    9
of the country into provinces changed between 1994 and 1998. In 2003 the province of 
households’ residence was not even collected in the survey.  
5  Linkages between the informal and formal sector in Burkina Faso 
5.1  Inter-household linkages between informal and formal earnings 
Research hypotheses and methodology 
Initially we try to analyze if and to what extent informal and the formal sector earnings 
are linked on a macro level. If any of these linkages exist between the informal and the 
formal sector, then we should observe some impact from formal earnings on informal 
earnings. In contrast, if the informal sector is an autonomous sector not linked to the rest 
of the economy, formal earnings should play no role for informal earnings. Hence, 
ideally one would try to test if the growth of formal earnings is linked in any systematic 
and causal way to informal earnings. One should think that such causal relationships 
will be specific to some local markets especially in a country like Burkina Faso, which 
has a relatively high spatial segmentation of its economy with relatively low spill over 
effects across regions (see Grimm and Günther 2004). Put differently, such linkages 
should be examined on the basis of some spatially defined clusters: villages, provinces 
or regions. 
Of course, when we make this assumption, the problem arises how we can disentangle 
the effect of formal earnings from the effects of local characteristics. More precisely, in 
case we find a positive spatial correlation between formal and informal earnings, we 
should test between three competing hypotheses:5 
Formal and informal earnings are correlated because there exist forward and backward 
linkages between formal and informal earnings via demand for final goods (forward 
linkage) and intermediate inputs (backward linkage), and via intra-household linkages, 
with the formal sector household members investing in the informal sector and 
increasing by this the marginal productivity of the informal sector and with households’ 
collective decision determining informal labour supply. Important to note, that such a 
linkage between the formal and informal sector could be completely simultaneous or 
involve some time lag. 
Formal and informal earnings are correlated because both depend on similar observed 
and unobserved household and individual characteristics and people with similar 
characteristics concentrate spatially (free household mobility assumed). In other words 
good craftsman, good traders and otherwise talented people cluster in the same region 
causing relatively high earnings in all segments of the (local) economy, whereas in other 
regions people with rather unfavourable characteristics live together and cause thus 
lower earnings. Under these circumstances formal and informal earnings can be 
correlated, but there is no direct causal link between them, both depend on third 
variables, i.e. the local socio-economic population structure. 
                                                 
5  The theoretical framework has some similarities with that used in the literature on poverty traps. See 
for instance De Vreyer et al. (2003) or Jalan and Ravallion (2002).   10
Formal and informal earnings are correlated because both depend first of all on 
geographic endowments like ecological conditions, or the supply of local public goods 
and infrastructure determining the marginal productivity of private inputs and therefore 
formal and informal earnings. In this case two otherwise identical informal workers do 
not experience the same growth in their living standards, if they live in areas with 
different endowments of geographic capital. Likewise, under these circumstances 
formal and informal earnings can be correlated, but there is no direct causal link 
between them, again both depend on third variables. 
Empirically, it is not easy to distinguish between these three competing hypotheses. 
Given the data we have for Burkina Faso, we cannot go very far: simply regress 
household specific informal earnings, ΠIF,h, on observed individual and household 
characteristics, Xh, including the number of persons involved in the informal activity, Lh 
and the ‘local’ level of formal earnings, ΠF,P. As ‘local’ we define here the average 
within provinces. For 1994, we have 16 provinces containing urban areas which sample 
between 20 and 1,494 households. For 1998 we have 19 provinces comprising urban 
areas which sample between 20 and 1,253 households. Unfortunately for 2003, the 
province of residence cannot be identified; therefore we have to take region specific 
variables, which are one level above the province level, i.e. 45 provinces make up 13 
regions. The equation to estimate writes in logarithmic form as follows: 
 log  ΠIF,h, = α log Lh + β Xh + γ log ΠF,P + uh         (1) 
This regression involves of course the problem that the OLS estimates of the coefficient 
γ of formal earnings can be biased due to the two issues discussed above: (i) unobserved 
heterogeneity in individual and province specific household characteristics correlated 
with formal earnings and (ii) unobserved local endowments correlated with formal 
earnings. To solve this problem, we would need panel data, which would allow an 
estimation in differences cancelling out the effect of local population patterns and 
geographic endowments, supposing that they are less or more constant over a ten year 
period. 
Given the absence of panel data for Burkina Faso, the best we can do is to control for 
province specific characteristics, as far as it is possible, and to compare the coefficient γ 
with the coefficient we obtain if we put in the equation instead of the province average 
level of formal earnings the province average level of non-labour income or total 
income less informal earnings.6 
Given that the sample of households involved in the informal sector cannot be assumed 
representative for the whole sample of households, we control for this potential 
selection bias using a selection model in the spirit of Heckman (1979), but estimated via 
the maximization of the full likelihood. As dependent variable we use the log of 
household informal earnings per capita. The per capita basis is here preferable to the per 
household basis given that almost all household members might to some extent be 
involved in the business and that in terms of impact of informal earnings on individual 
well-being it is the household per capita basis, which interests us the most. The log of 
                                                 
6  Alternatively, we could try to find an instrument for formal earnings, i.e. a variable explaining formal 
earnings, but being uncorrelated with geographical variables and with province specific household 
characteristics. However, given our data, such an instrument seems out of reach.   11
the declared number of employed persons, for which we also control, is more a measure 
of constantly and with a substantive amount of time involved persons. Furthermore, we 
include in the estimation equation sex, age and education of the household head and 
dummy variables indicating if there is a person in the household working in the public 
or private formal sector. 
Results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results. The control variables have all the expected signs 
and are relatively stable over time. An increase of the labour force employed in the 
business by 100 per cent increases the per capita earnings by 45 per cent to 60 per cent. 
Households headed by a man have on average higher earnings. Age of the household 
head is not significant, but age effects are partly captured by the household size variable 
and education variables. The log of household size has a negative sign as expected. 
Whereas some primary education or completed primary education has no significant 
effect on earnings, lower and higher secondary education as well as some technical 
education have a significant and positive impact. Knowledge of the French language 
enters also positively in the estimation equation. Over time, returns to education first 
decrease and then increase. This might among other things reflect that the stabilization 
of the urban economy after 1998 offered more possibilities for workers to use their 
human capital as production factor, i.e. via better investment opportunities. The dummy 
variables indicating if there is a person in the household working in the public or private 
formal sector are both negative, showing, that households drawing income from the 
formal economy are less involved in the informal economy and therefore have lower per 
capita informal earnings.  
The effect of the log of the province specific average of formal earnings (per capita) has 
a significant and positive effect on informal earnings. However, the ‘linkage coefficient’ 
is smaller than one and if we put the average of non-labour income or of total household 
income less informal earnings in the estimation equation we also find a positive impact 
and an even higher regression coefficient. More precisely, whereas a one per cent 
increase in formal earnings increases informal earnings by 0.16 per cent to 0.20 per 
cent, a one per cent increase in non-labour income increases informal earnings by 0.48 
per cent to 0.79 per cent. The effect of total household income less informal earnings 
lies in-between. If we put formal income and non-labour income together in the 
estimation equation, we find that the return to the province average of non-labour 
income is higher in 1994 and 1998. In 2003 the coefficient of non-labour income is 
slightly lower and not significant. However, both income sources are of course 
correlated. The correlation coefficient amounts to 0.77 in 1994, 0.33 in 1998 and 0.46 in 
2003. If we control in addition for the province specific share of workers involved in the 
formal sector, we find no uniform result across years. In 1994 this share has a huge 
positive impact on informal earnings, in 1998 the effect of this variable is not significant 
and in 2003 both variables, formal earnings and the share of formal workers, are not 
significant when they enter together in the equation. Likewise, it is not very conclusive 
if we put the province specific share of informal workers in the equation. For 1994 and 
1998 its effect is strongly positive and outweighs the effect of formal earnings, but for 
2003 this variable is not significant. All this might suggest, that the inter-household 
linkages between informal and formal earnings even if present are rather low, and it 
seems that it is the province specific income level in general which matters most.    12
Finally, it should again be emphasized that we have to be cautious with the 
interpretation of these estimations, given that we cannot appropriately control for the 
effects of unobserved province specific household characteristics and geographic 
endowments. We tried to create some variables reflecting features of the provinces as 
for instance the province specific age, education and employment structure and the 
share of households connected to electricity or modern water facilities, but the 
consideration of these variables in the estimation equation did not yield any reliable 
results. 
To examine however some temporal variations in income sources, we compare now 
region-specific growth rates of different earning categories and compute correlation 
coefficients between them. As mentioned the region is the lowest spatial level, for 
which we have a consistent divide in 1994, 1998 and 2003. Given that we have only 
three points in time and ten regions we cannot perform any type of panel or pseudo-
panel regression analysis, so we offer here a purely descriptive analysis. 
Table 4 shows growth rates of income by region and different income sources (in 
parentheses the shares in total income of each income source). One can note that during 
the period 1994 to 1998 in seven out of ten regions growth of informal earnings had the 
same sign than growth of formal earnings. If we look at the link with other income 
sources, we state that this is only the case for four regions. This is also confirmed by the 
regression coefficient which is obtained if we regress the growth rate of informal 
earnings on the growth rates of the different income categories. It is 0.04 for formal 
earnings and -0.07 for other income sources. The correlation coefficient between the 
different sources of earnings also seems to indicate that the link between informal and 
formal earnings is the strongest of all. However, we obtain an even higher correlation if 
we compare growth of informal earnings with growth of total income. So again, it could 
also be income in general which matters most, i.e. the sum of informal and formal 
earnings. In almost all regions more than 70 per cent of total income comes from 
informal and formal activity. Furthermore, we can state that in most cases of positive 
growth of formal earnings, the growth rate of informal earnings was lower, but, that in 
contrast, in most cases of negative growth of formal earnings, the contraction of 
informal earnings was higher. This suggests that during economic downturns the 
informal sector suffers more than the formal sector and that during booms the informal 
sector benefits less than the formal sector. Finally, we see that the period’s initial level 
of informal earnings, formal earnings and total income is negatively related to the 
growth rate of informal earnings. 
If we look at the period 1998 to 2003, the correlation between informal and formal 
earnings is less clear. The sign of informal and formal growth rates is only in five of the 
ten regions identical. The correlation coefficients between growth of informal earnings 
and growth of formal earnings on the one hand, and growth of informal earnings and 
growth of other income sources, on the other hand, have almost the same magnitude. As 
mentioned earlier the period between 1994 and 1998 was a period of increasing urban 
poverty, whereas between 1998 and 2003 urban poverty declined, this might be a reason 
for the changed correlation. But this would mean that there are some effects coming 
from the overall rate of economic growth modifying regional linkages between informal 
and formal earnings. 
If we examine the whole period 1994 to 2003, we have again only for five regions 
identical signs of the growth rates of informal and formal earnings. But the regression   13
coefficient and correlation coefficient between both are significantly higher than for 
other income sources. However, the negative correlation between the initial level of the 
different earnings categories and the growth rate of informal earnings disappeared.  
To conclude on these correlations: It seems that there is a stronger link between 
informal earnings and formal earnings than between informal earnings and other income 
sources. However this link seems not particularly strong and is not uniform across 
regions and time. A higher level of income seems not necessarily to favour a higher 
growth rate of informal income. It is also worth to emphasize that this link seems not to 
depend on cotton production, i.e. in the major cotton producing regions informal 
earnings did not systematically grow more than in other regions. More cannot be drawn 
from this exercise. Especially it is hard to say anything on causalities, given that we 
cannot appropriately control for the influence of regional characteristics – as public 
expenditures or a favourable evolution of the socio-demographic population structure – 
on the growth rates of the different income sources.  
5.2  Intra-household linkages between informal and formal labour and earnings 
Research hypotheses and methodology 
In this section we analyze if and to what magnitude intra-household linkages between 
the informal and formal sector exist. Taking into account the socio-economic 
importance of household units in the sub-Saharan African context, we consider 
households as the centre of labour supply decisions and earnings. Our hypotheses is, 
that household position as well as other household’s members’ activity and earnings 
have a high impact on individuals’ labour participation and earnings in the informal 
sector. For simplicity we only distinguish between first household position (referred to 
as household head here on), which we determine by taking the individual with the 
highest earnings within a household. The ‘second household position’ (or second order 
income) is given to all other household members older than 14 years. Concerning sector 
employment we only distinguish between formal (which includes the private formal as 
well as the public sector), informal (which includes both self-employment as well as 
family help and other non-remunerated work) and non-occupied (which includes 
unemployed as well as inactive persons). This analysis comprises two parts.  
First, we undertake an examination to what extent labour supply and sector choice are 
determined by the individual’s position within the household as well as by the 
household head’s sector of occupation and earnings. Our hypothesis is that informal 
income in many households constitutes a secondary household income and hence the 
percentage of informal labour participation is much lower if one only considers 
individuals with a first household position and much higher if one only considers 
members with a secondary household position. Also, we assume that secondary 
household members will increase their labour market participation with decreasing 
earnings of the household head to retain the overall household income level (buffer 
function of the informal sector via intra-household linkages). In addition we test for 
correlation between sector of employment of the household head and the sector choice 
of secondary household members. Again, the assumption is, that we will find a positive 
correlation, which should even increase if we do not control for education, assuming 
that household heads employed in the formal sector can afford higher investments in 
education for other household members, which in return will increase their probability   14
to find a job in the formal sector. To analyze this issue, we estimate the following 
multinomial logit model: 
 Prob  (Li= j) = [exp(λjX Xihj + λjS SiHeadj + λjW log WiHeadj)] /  
 [ ∑j = 1 exp(λjX Xihj + λjS SiHeadj + λjW log WiHeadj)]       (2) 
giving the probability that individual i takes the occupational choice Li = j, where Xih is 
a vector of individual and household characteristics, as age, education and sex. Shead is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating the sector of employment of the household head 
and log WHead is the log of monthly earnings of the household head. To test the 
robustness of this chosen functional form, we also estimate a simple probit model by 
regressing a binary variable taking the value one if the individual is in the informal 
sector and zero if the individual is in the formal sector. The option ‘being not-occupied’ 
is included by estimating this function simultaneously with a selection equation, where 
the selection variable indicates the value one if the individual is occupied and zero 
otherwise. The selection model can then be used to analyze the determinants of labour 
market participation. 
Second, we analyze the impact of household position, the household head’s sector of 
employment and the household head’s earnings on other household members’ earnings. 
Evidently, since we put household members with the highest earnings on first position, 
individuals with a secondary household position will have lower earnings. However, 
here we try to give an estimate to what magnitude informal earnings can differ 
(controlled for socio-economic characteristics) if undertaken as a main activity (first 
household position) or to supplement the main household income (second household 
position). If we can observe substantial differences, this would support the argument 
that we should indeed be more cautious when analyzing the informal sector as one 
homogeneous group, since household informal income might then not only differ in 
terms of level but also how it is linked to the formal sector on a macro level. Further, we 
test the impact of the household head’s sector of employment and earnings on 
secondary member’s earnings. If intra-household investments indeed take place, 
secondary household member’s informal earnings should be higher (controlled for 
education and experience) if the household head is occupied in the formal sector and 
hence has a higher wage he can invest into the informal business of other household 
members.7  
 log  Wih, = β Xih + ψ Cih + α Sihead + γ log WiHead + uih     (3) 
where log Wih is the log of individual earnings of person i belonging to household h, Xih 
are individual and household characteristics as before but also indicator variables for the 
branch of activity (primary, secondary, tertiary, administration) and the sector of 
employment. Cih is a dummy variable taking the value one if individual i is not the 
earner of the main income in household h. In a last step we examine if the impact of the 
household head’s earnings increase if we do not control for education, since higher 
informal earnings might also take place through higher investments into the education 
of secondary household members.  
                                                 
7  Most of informal sector activity in Burkina Faso is independent and self-employed and not informal 
wage earnings. Hence we can assume that intra-household investments can easily take place.   15
When estimating the equations, we also control for selection into the group of occupied 
persons using the usual Heckman selection model, but estimate it by maximization of 
the full likelihood. Of course, and as already mentioned in section 5.1, we cannot 
control for unobserved household characteristics which might influence all household 
member’s occupational choices as well as earnings and hence lead to a correlation of 
earnings and labour market participation of household members. Unfortunately, we also 
do not have any variables concerning hours worked. However, we could somewhat 
control for infrastructure differences by including the residence of households as an 
independent variable. Since we do not have any panel data, we have to rely on cross 
sectional regressions for 1994, 1998 and 2003. However we can use those different 
coefficients to analyze if intra-household linkages have changed over time and to 
conclude about their robustness. 
Last, as a complementary analysis, we examine how the formal and informal sector is 
linked in terms of individual well-being. Linkages between the formal and informal 
sector can be observed in terms of earnings or in terms of per capita expenditure, i.e. 
well-being. The former are important to understand labour markets, but only give a 
partial insight into individual well-being. A useful mean to complement an analysis of 
linkages between the formal and informal sector for a well-being or poverty assessment, 
seems then to be an examination how the per capita expenditure (and not earnings) of 
people involved in the informal sector is linked to the formal sector. If we make the 
hypothesis that earnings of individuals within a household are also used by other 
household members (for poverty analysis normally a uniform intra-household 
expenditure distribution is assumed), an analysis of the impact of the household’s 
employment structure on per capita household expenditure, Eh, should give useful 
insights. Hence, we estimate the following equation: 
 log  Eh, = β Xh + α Shead + γ log WHead + uh         (4) 
where Xh is a vector of household characteristics, as the pattern of labour supply (in 
terms of sectors of employment across household members), the sex and age 
composition of the household and also the fact if the household received some monetary 
transfers. Shead is a vector of dummy variables indicating the sector of employment of 
the household head and log WHead is the log of monthly earnings of the household head. 
Furthermore, a comparison of individuals’ sector of employment with individuals’ 
sector dependence (in terms of how many people are connected to formal or informal 
sector income via other household members) should be an interesting issue to analyze. 
Results 
Tables 5-8 show the estimation results of intra-household linkages between the informal 
and formal sector. All control variables have the expected sign and are most of the time 
relatively stable over time. Age has a positive impact on overall labour market 
participation but a negative impact on informal labour market participation, i.e. with 
increasing age a person is more likely to be occupied and more likely to be found in the 
formal sector. The same is true for education, with higher education leading to both 
higher labour market participation and higher chance of finding a job in the formal 
sector. However in 2003 we find more people with higher education in the informal 
sector than in 1994 and 1998. Concerning wage rates, secondary as well as technical 
education has a significant and positive impact on wage levels in both the formal as well 
as in the informal sector. However, and as already mentioned in section 5.1, primary   16
education has no significant impact on wage rates. Again, overall returns to education 
seem to have decreased between 1994 and 1998 and then increased again between 1998 
and 2003. However if one only observes the informal sector employment, it seems, that 
returns to education have decreased over the whole period 1994-2003. 
In Table 5 and Table 6 we tried to analyze the role of intra-household linkages in 
determining formal and informal labour supply. We used both the multinomial logit 
model as well as the Heckman selection model, which both led to the same conclusions. 
Since we set those household members with the highest income on first position, we 
would expect that we find formal wage earners less likely than informal sector earners 
and informal sector earners less likely than inactive persons on secondary household 
positions (see Table 6 (1)).8 However, we do not find uniformly formal sector 
employment – if existent within a household and controlled for socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals – as the main labour income. The coefficients changed 
significantly between 1994 and 2003. For instance comparing the coefficients of a 
secondary household member being formal or informal, then within the last 10 years it 
has become more likely that we find a formal wage earner on secondary position, 
indicating that informal earnings – controlled for socio-economic characteristics – have 
caught up in relation to formal wages (which would also be supported by the descriptive 
statistics in Table 2).  
Next, we assessed, what impact the household head’s occupation and earnings have on 
labour market participation of other household members. Both the Heckman selection 
model as well as the multinomial logit model suggest that formal earnings of the 
household head as well as general higher earnings of the household head lead to a lower 
labour participation rate of other household members but to a higher probability to be 
found in the formal labour market, i.e. to a lower informal labour market participation 
(Table 5 and Table 6 (2)).9 The estimated coefficients are highly significant over all 
three years and approximately equal in magnitude.  
Last, we assessed the impact of household position (Table 7) and the household head’s 
sector of occupation and earnings (Table 8) on formal and informal wage earnings. 
Again, it is evident, that secondary household position has a negative impact on labour 
earnings, since we set first and second household members endogenously by their 
respective monthly wage rate. However we can observe that this coefficient is much 
higher if we only consider informal earnings (Table 7 (2)). Hence the earnings 
differential between informal first income and informal secondary income – controlled 
for socio-economic characteristics of individuals – is much higher than the wage 
differential between formal first and formal secondary income, supporting the 
hypothesis of ‘upper-tiers’ or ‘first income’ and ‘lower-tiers’ or ‘second-income’ 
informal earnings. Second, this informal ‘dichotomy’ coefficient has decreased over 
time. However we cannot say if this is due to the fact that main informal incomes have 
                                                 
8  An additional interesting descriptive statistics might be the following: Of all informal sector earners 
only around 25-30 per cent provide the ‘first order’ income within their households, whereas among 
public and private formal wage earners 70-80 per cent and 55-70 per cent respectively provide the main 
or ‘first order’ household income source for their households. 
9  Those coefficients increase if one does not control for education (not shown here), suggesting that 
formal (higher) earnings also have a positive impact on formal labour market participation of other 
household members via increased investment into education.   17
decreased (with formal wages) or because ‘side’ informal incomes have increased. 
Examining those two ‘sub-sectors’ of the informal sector in more detail could form 
interesting further research.  
Concerning the impact of the household head’s sector choice and earnings and labour 
earnings of other household members, we observe a strong positive impact of the 
household head’s wage level on other household member wages levels (Table 8 (1)), 
which is slightly larger if we only examine the impact of the main wage on second order 
informal wages (Table 8 (2)). This could indicate that ‘intra-household investments’ of 
household members employed in the formal sector into informal sector enterprises do 
indeed take place. However, besides the generally higher wage level of formal wage 
earners, the additional fact that the household head generates this higher wage from 
the formal sector has no impact (Table 8 (1)) or even a negative impact (Table 8 (2)) on 
the wage level of other household members. This does not necessarily question the 
existence of positive intra-household linkages between formal and informal sector 
earnings. It only implicates that if such positive linkages do exist, they are only 
established via the generally higher formal income. This means, that a high first order 
income, which is earned in the informal sector has the same positive impact on other 
household members’ earnings. 
As a complementary analysis we then assessed the linkages between the formal and 
informal sector in terms of individual well-being. Table 9 shows the dependency ratio of 
urban household members on sector specific labour earnings. Approximately 40 per 
cent of the total urban population lives in households, where the main income comes 
from the formal sector (public or private formal). Comparing this number with those in 
Table 1, which shows that only 25 per cent of the active urban population is employed 
in the formal sector, suggests that formal sector earnings might play a much more 
important role for urban household incomes, or well-being, than sector employment 
rates would indicate. In addition, the 25 per cent of urban households, which receive 
labour income from both the formal as well as informal sector (Table 9), indicates that 
linkages between the formal and informal sector in terms of individual well-being (or 
expenditure) play a very important role and we can make the assumption that at least 
within those households informal labour employees might benefit from higher formal 
wages irrespective of the fact if their personal informal earnings increase or not.  
In Table 10 we then regressed the log of per capita household expenditure on various 
variables for the labour structure of households. Of course these regressions should be 
seen as a purely descriptive analysis revealing some interesting correlations, but not as 
evidence for any causality, given the problem of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. 
Throughout all years per capita household expenditure is positively correlated with the 
percentage of active household members, with the percentage of those being employed 
in the formal sector relative to household members employed in the informal sector 
(however with diminishing returns over the years) and with the level of earnings of the 
main income source. More precisely, if the households head’s earnings increase by 
1 per cent, the per capita expenditure of all other household members increase by 0.29-
0.39 per cent (Table 10 (2)) – irrespective if their earnings increase or not or if they are 
part of the active work force. Moreover if the percentage of household members 
occupied in the formal sector increases by 1 per cent, per capita expenditure will 
increase by 0.30 per cent (Table 10 (2)). However, it does not seem to be important if 
the main income is coming from the formal or informal sector (Table 10 (1)). This could 
show that informal earnings, that constitute the major income for households do not   18
differ significantly from formal sector income, as informal sector activities, that are 
undertaken as secondary household activity, do. Hence, when we observe that 
households, where the household head is employed in the informal sector, are poorer on 
average than households, where the household head is employed in the formal sector, 
this has probably more to do with the fact that if the household head is employed in the 
formal sector, other household members are also more likely to be employed in the 
formal sector (see Tables 5 and 6). As a result, for poverty assessments we should be 
more interested in a classification of households by their household occupation structure 
than by the household head’s sector occupation. 
To conclude, intra-household linkages seem to play an important role in labour market 
participation. Where the first household income comes from the formal sector, other 
household members are less likely to work and less likely to be found in the informal 
than in the formal sector. Second, with decreasing wages of the household head, 
secondary household members will increase their labour supply and will mostly be 
found in the informal sector. Concerning wage levels of secondary household members 
working in the informal sector, it is less the sector of employment of the household head 
but more the level of earnings of the household head that has a high impact on other 
household members’ earnings. However, since generally average formal wages are 
higher than informal wages, we find a positive impact of formal wages on informal 
earnings of other household members. In addition, we have shown that intra-household 
linkages are not only important concerning formal and informal sector earnings but 
equally important concerning formal and informal sector well-beings. Last, we think 
that this analysis has also shown, that one should distinguish between informal income, 
that constitutes the main income of a household and informal income that only 
complements the main revenues of a household.  
6  Conclusion and implications for pro-poor growth policies 
Although much has been written on the possible linkages between the formal and 
informal sector and their importance for informal sector policy recommendations, to our 
knowledge, relatively little empirical analysis on those linkages exists so far. Therefore, 
in this study we tried to analyse the linkages between formal and informal sector 
earnings on a macro (inter-household linkages) as well as on a micro (intra-household 
linkages) level for the case of Burkina Faso. We showed that informal sector earnings 
are in deed positively linked to formal sector earnings on both the macro as well as on 
the micro level. However, this linkage coefficient is much stronger within households 
than between households. In addition, on a macro level it seems to be more the overall 
economic performance than the formal earnings that matter for informal sector earnings.  
In sum this indicates, that the formal and informal sector in Burkina Faso are primarily 
linked through the final product market (forward linkages) and through the informal 
capital factor market (formal sector earnings being invested into informal business of 
other household members), but less through the input product market (backward 
linkages) and the labour market. This would also explain, why in Burkina Faso we saw 
stagnating or decreasing informal labour earnings despite formal economic growth, 
which was however accompanied by stagnating or decreasing formal sector wages. 
However, a detailed analysis of the product and factor market and their impact on the 
linkages between formal and informal sector earnings, constitutes a next step in the 
course of this broader linkages research question.    19
We have also shown, that intra-household linkages play an important role in 
determining labour supply and sectoral choice and that it would be useful to distinguish 
between informal sector earnings that constitute the main income source of households 
and informal sector earnings that only complement the main (informal or formal) 
income within households. Both findings might also explain part of the linkages we 
observe on the macro level. Again, this research could be extended and also the impact 
of inter-household linkages on intra-household linkages could be analysed. 
For pro-poor growth policies in Burkina Faso, and in particular if we see the informal 
sector as the economy of the poor, all this would mean, that since the informal sector is 
positively linked to the formal sector, good (formal) growth policies are also good pro-
poor growth policies. But, since we consider backward linkages as rather weak, this is 
only the case if this formal economic growth comes along with increasing formal wages 
and does not only benefit enterprise profits. However, this study has also shown that the 
linkage coefficient for both inter- as well as intra-household linkages is smaller than one 
and hence good formal growth policies might not be enough for sufficient informal 
sectoral growth. Also, this analysis has shown that formal sector growth policies will be 
more beneficial for informal sector earners that are linked to the formal sector via 
households – i.e. intra-household linkages – and less to informal sector earners that are 
only linked to the formal sector via the market. As a result, pure ‘informal’ households 
might be left out of the overall economic growth process. Hence a deeper analysis of 
this differential linkage coefficients and their impact on pro-poor growth might be 
another further interesting issue.  
Last, intra-household linkages become even more important if one does not only 
consider earnings linkages but also individuals’ well-being (per capita expenditure) 
linkages, which might even be more important for pro-poor growth and poverty 
reduction. If we assume that formal earnings have a direct – and not only indirect via 
the product or factor market – impact on individuals’ well-being if earned within the 
same household, then growth of formal labour earnings might have a direct positive 
impact on informal labour earners without even increasing their personal informal 
earnings. However this would further increase the dichotomy not between informal and 
formal wage earners but between ‘formal and informal’ households. 
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Table 1 
Occupation and employment of the urban adult population (15 years and older) 
 
  1994 1998 2003 
Occupied 53.2  58.7  58.2 
of whom     
  (1) Public wage earner  12.8  12.3  12.7 
  (2) Private formal wage earner  13.6  16.8  17.0 
  (3) Independent (informal)  41.3  (37.5)  40.6 
of whom     
 Trade  sector  62.6  69.3  72.6 
 Manufactory  sector  17.4  15.3  13.2 
  Other commercial services  11.1  5.7  2.6 
(4) Family help  25.6  (29.0)  21.7 
(5) Non-remunerated (outside family)  6.8  4.4  8.1 
of whom (only cat. 1-3)     
 Permanent  contract  85.9  91.2  75.5 
 Seasonal  6.3  3.5  13.8 
 Daily  1.8  0.9  8.8 
 Other  temporary  6.0  4.5  1.9 
 Unemployed  (open)  8.9  9.4  12.8 
  Enrolled in school/university  14.3  14.5  13.5 
 Inactive  23.7  17.4  15.5 
Dependency ratio (over households) 
a) 63.1  57.4  57.4 
 
Notes: All figures are percentages. Occupation and activity concerns those carried out the 
seven days before the survey. However, we computed the same statistics for the main activity 
the last 12 month; the results were not significantly different. Numbers in parentheses signify 
that we presume strong measurement error. 
a) The dependency ratio is computed over 
households, it is defined as the number of inactive and unemployed persons divided by the 
household size. 
Source: Grimm and Günther (2004); Database used: EPI, EPII and EPIII (see section 4). 
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Table 2 
Average urban real monthly earnings 
(000 CFAF, at 1994 level, in Ouagadougou) 
  1994 1998 2003 
     
(1)  Public  wage  earner     
   Total  average  130  74  81 
    (1994 = 100)  (100)  (56.9)  (62.3) 
    Median  65 57 62 
    (1994 = 100)  (100)  (87.6)  (95.4) 
    Average first quintile  32  24  25 
    Average  second  quintile  51 43 49 
     
(2)  Private formal wage earner       
  Total  average  97 37 48 
  (1994 = 100)  (100)  (38.1)  (49.5) 
  Median  27 20 24 
  (1994 = 100)  (100)  (74.0)  (88.9) 
  Average first quintile  7  7  9 
  Average  second  quintile  17 13 18 
     
(3)  Independent  (informal)     
  Total  average  75 36 36 
  (1994 = 100)  (100)  (48.0)  (48.0) 
  Median  10 12 15 
  (1994 = 100)  (100)  (120)  (150) 
  Average first quintile  2  2  3 
 Average  second  quintile  5  6  7 
     
     
Ratios between median earnings       
  (2)/(1) in per cent  41.5  35.1  38.7 
  (3)/(1) in per cent  15.4  21.1  24.2 
  (3)/(2) in per cent  37.0  60.0  62.5 
     
     
Percentage of workers living in a poor HH       
  Public  wage  earner  1.0 4.0 2.5 
  Private formal wage earner  6.6  13.3  12.8 
 Independent  (informal)  14.3  26.4  20.3 
     
 
Note: The monthly minimum wage is currently at 25,000 CFAF (≈ 19,000 CFAF at 1994 level). 
In 1994, 1998 and 2003 18.8 per cent, 13.7 per cent and 9.3 per cent of all public, private formal 
and informal workers declared no earnings. Those who declared no earnings are almost all 
workers in the informal sector; older than the average, often head of a household (except in 
2003) and less educated than the average. Another bias is due to the fact that the recall period 
for wages in 1994 was 7 days, whereas in 1998 and 2003 the interviewed person was allowed 
to choose the recall period. Most declarations were then made per month (25-30 per cent) or 
per year (60 per cent). 
Source: Grimm and Günther (2004); Data base used: EPI, EPII and EPIII (see section 4).   24
Table 3 
Estimation of informal earning functions 
Urban areas only, selection model (Full MLE), 1994, 1998, 2003 
Dependent variable log of 














1994         
Log no. of workers 
a)  0.506*** 0.509*** 0.509*** 0.508***  0.548*** 0.518*** 
Head male  0.235**  0.241**  0.235**  0.238**  0.194*  0.225** 
Age of head  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.006 
Squared age of head  0.123  0.272 0.180 0.248  0.101 0.398 
Log  HH-size  -0.759*** -0.753*** -0.756*** -0.755***  -0.754*** -0.746*** 
Education level HH head             
  No  schooling  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref. 
  Some primary educ  -0.033  -0.041 -0.034 -0.036  -0.025 -0.024 
 Primary  compl  -0.021  -0.037 -0.026 -0.032  -0.045 -0.041 
  Some or compl low sec  0.517***  0.499***  0.510***  0.505***  0.527***  0.513*** 
  Some or compl high sec  1.497***  1.480***  1.488***  1.483***  1.462***  1.473*** 
 Technical  educ  0.416*  0.363 0.415*  0.382  0.447*  0.374 
 Speaks/writes  French  0.675***  0.689*** 0.675*** 0.681***  0.686*** 0.688*** 
Public worker in HH  -0.867***  -0.863***  -0.871***  -0.867***  -0.886***  -0.873*** 
Private formal worker in HH  -0.518***  -0.537*** -0.529*** -0.535***  -0.574*** -0.553*** 
Province average log formal 
earnings 
b) 0.178***      0.069  -0.180**  0.014 
Province average log non-labour inc 
b)   0.483***   0.329**    
Province average log tot non-
informal income 
b)    0.310***      
Province share of formal workers 
b)         7.382***   
Province share of informal workers 
b)        2.902*** 
Intercept  10.648*** 7.449***  8.967***  8.334***  13.856*** 12.068*** 
rho 
c)  -0.910*** -0.903*** -0.907*** -0.905***  -0.893*** -0.900*** 
No. of observations  2706  2706  2706  2706  2706  2706 
No. of non-censored observations 
d)  1249 1249 1249 1249  1249 1249 
Log-likelihood    3808 3806 3805 3805  3794 3802 
1998         
Log No. of workers 
a)  0.583*** 0.601*** 0.581*** 0.590 ***  0.583*** 0.585*** 
Head  male  0.502*** 0.474*** 0.498*** 0.481***  0.502*** 0.499*** 
Age of head  0.010  0.007  0.009 0.008  0.010 0.009 
Squared age of head  -1.476  -1.285 -1.388 -1.284  -1.467 -1.395 
Log  HH-size  -0.933*** -0.929*** -0.930*** -0.926***  -0.933*** -0.925*** 
Education level HH head             
  No  schooling  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref. 
  Some primary educ  -0.098  -0.115 -0.102 -0.106  -0.098 -0.087 
 Primary  compl  -0.228  -0.234 -0.222 -0.227  -0.228 -0.218 
  Some or compl low sec  0.136    0.137  0.141  0.138  0.137  0.147 
  Some or compl high sec  1.007***  1.042***  1.012***  1.024***  1.006***  1.017*** 
  Technical  educ  0.922*** 0.929*** 0.926*** 0.941***  0.921*** 0.918*** 
 Speaks/writes  French  0.490***  0.520*** 0.490*** 0.496***  0.490*** 0.486*** 
Public worker in HH  -1.057***  -1.061***  -1.055***  -1.063***  -1.057***  -1.054*** 
Private formal worker in HH  -0.460***  -0.420*** -0.461*** -0.454***  -0.461*** -0.465*** 
Province average log formal 
earnings 
b) 0.168***      0.100***  0.161**  0.080 
Province average log non-labour 
inc
b)   0.785***   0.568***      25
Table 3 (continued) 
 
Province average log tot non-
informal income 
b)    0.355***      
Province share of formal workers 
b)         0.096   
Province share of informal workers 
b)        1.844* 
Intercept  10.388*** 3.994***  8.106***  5.171***  10.453*** 11.165*** 
rho 
c)  -0.897*** -0.903*** -0.900*** -0.901***  -0.897*** -0.897*** 
No. of observations  2583  2583  2583  2583  2583  2583 
No. of non-censored observations 
d)  1300 1300 1300 1300  1300 1300 
Log-likelihood    3533 3530 3532 3527  3533 3532 
Dependent variable log of 
household informal earnings per 
capita 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
2003         
Log no. of workers 
a)  0.456*** 0.449*** 0.455*** 0.453***  0.454*** 0.450*** 
Head male  0.188*  0.205*  0.194**  0.191**  0.190**  0.192** 
Age of head  -0.011  -0.009  -0.010  -0.011  -0.011  -0.012 
Squared age of head  0.186  0.076 0.106 0.160  0.199 0.228 
Log  HH-size  -0.803*** -0.794*** -0.803*** -0.801***  -0.801*** -0.799*** 
Education level HH head             
  No  schooling  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref. 
  Some primary educ  -0.237  -0.226 -0.235 -0.235  -0.238 -0.237 
 Primary  compl  -0.001  0.021 0.014 0.005  0.000 -0.002 
  Some or compl low sec  0.214  0.216  0.216  0.214  0.212  0.210 
  Some or compl high sec  1.163***  1.203***  1.181***  1.169***  1.161***  1.158*** 
  Technical  educ  0.732** 0.816***  0.742** 0.746**  0.730** 0.737** 
 Speaks/writes  French  0.405**  0.417** 0.409** 0.410**  0.408** 0.408** 
Public worker in HH  -0.572***  -0.605***  -0.581***  -0.580***  -0.572***  -0.578*** 
Private formal worker in HH  -0.304***  -0.296*** -0.310*** -0.308***  -0.307*** -0.306*** 
Regional average log formal 
earnings 
b) 0.201***      0.162***  0.144  0.134** 
Regional average log non-labour inc 
b)   0.528***   0.156    
Regional average log tot non-
informal income 
b)    0.440***      
Regional share of formal workers 
b)         0.934   
Regional share of informal workers 
b)        1.281 
Intercept  10.727*** 7.168***  7.719***  9.458***  11.256*** 11.323*** 
rho 
c) -0.852***  -0.863***  -0.861***  -0.856***  -0.853  -0.853*** 
No. of observations  2556  2556  2556  2556  2556  2556 
No. of non-censored observations 
d)  1341 1341 1341 1341  1341 1341 
Log-likelihood    3268 3274 3266 3267  3267 3267 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively. 
a) log of the number of 
employed workers from inside and outside the household in the informal activity of the household. 
b) The 
Province specific variables are computed without considering the household itself. 
c) rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the residuals of the earnings regression and the selection function. As explanatory 
variables in the selection function we use variables for the age and sex composition of the household, 
knowledge of French, education and age of the household head: 
d) censored households are those who 
declared not have had earnings from informal activity. 
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; estimations by the authors.   26
Table 4 
Annual growth of real per capita income by region and source between 1994, 1998 and 2003 in 
urban areas 
Incomes are deflated by the general consumer price index 
(in parentheses the share of each income source in total income) 

























1994-98            
Ouest  (Bobo)  -0.018 -0.014 -0.058 -0.030 -0.020 0.200  0.192  Yes 
  (0.318) (0.4249)  (0.258) (0.682) (1.000)      
Nord-Ouest -0.172 -0.089 0.039  -0.038 -0.063 0.034  0.027  Yes 
  (0.432) (0.371) (0.197) (0.568) (1.000)      
Sahel  -0.341  0.104 0.178 0.115 -0.006  0.011  0.009  No 
  (0.425) (0.497) (0.079) (0.575) (1.000)      
Est  -0.195 -0.116 -0.092 -0.111 -0.119 0.017  0.022  No 
  (0.316) (0.533) (0.151) (0.684) (1.000)      
Sud-Ouest
 a)  0.060  -0.485 0.187  -0.238 -0.166 0.006  0.008  Yes 
  (0.054) (0.815) (0.132) (0.946) (1.000)      
Centre-Nord  0.056 0.208 -0.187  0.042 0.035 0.031  0.020  No 
  (0.251) (0.329) (0.420) (0.749) (1.000)      
Centre-Ouest  -0.002 -0.100 0.110  -0.034 -0.006 0.063  0.068  No 
  (0.212) (0.594) (0.194) (0.788) (1.000)      
Centre  (Ouaga)  -0.023  0.092 -0.058  0.050 0.016 0.533  0.600  No 
  (0.305) (0.472) (0.224) (0.695) (1.000)      
Nord  0.014 0.216 0.077 0.160 0.121 0.076  0.039  No 
  (0.449) (0.302) (0.248) (0.551) (1.000)      
Centre-Est 0.106 0.261 -0.134  0.090 0.204 0.030  0.014  No 
  (0.280) (0.312) (0.409) (0.720) (1.000)      
β (gr-gr)
b)    0.041  -0.367 -0.091 0.492      
ϕ1 (gr-gr)
c)    0.065  -0.343 -0.076 0.378      
ϕ2 (gr-lev)
d) -0.783  -0.019  0.613 0.094 -0.184      
            
1998-2003            
Ouest  (Bobo)  -0.023  0.017 0.016 0.017 0.006 0.242  0.211  Yes 
  (0.329) (0.446) (0.226) (0.671) (1.000)      
Nord-Ouest -0.058 -0.152 -0.102 -0.127 -0.066 0.051  0.031  Yes 
  (0.294) (0.372) (0.334) (0.706) (1.000)      
Sahel  0.183  -0.182 0.168  -0.076 -0.061 0.014  0.012  No 
  (0.083) (0.761) (0.156) (0.917) (1.000)      
Est  -0.108 -0.062 0.074  -0.022 0.014  0.029  0.022  No 
  (0.237) (0.580) (0.182) (0.763) (1.000)      
Sud-Ouest
 a)  0.136 0.313 -0.111  0.030 0.035 0.008  0.005  Yes 
  (0.175) (0.148) (0.677) (0.825) (1.000)      
Centre-Nord  0.103 -0.020  0.139 0.022 0.083 0.037  0.027  No 
  (0.261) (0.586) (0.153) (0.739) (1.000)      
Centre-Ouest  0.035  -0.139 0.006  -0.065 -0.030 0.069  0.071  No 
  (0.235) (0.435) (0.330) (0.765) (1.000)      
Centre  (Ouaga)  -0.002  -0.004  0.092 0.019 0.014 0.444  0.526  No 
  (0.247) (0.596) (0.156) (0.753) (1.000)      
Nord  -0.037 -0.092 -0.028 -0.068 -0.029 0.059  0.047  No 
  (0.323) (0.449) (0.228) (0.677) (1.000)      
Centre-Est -0.098  0.066 0.140 0.085 -0.011  0.048  0.047  No 
  (0.292) (0.548) (0.160) (0.708) (1.000)      
β (gr-gr)
b)    0.095 0.109 -0.105  0.337     
ϕ1 (gr-gr)
c)    0.138 0.110 -0.068  0.153     
ϕ2 (gr-lev)
d) -0.524  0.072 0.324 0.254 -0.172      
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1994-2003            
Ouest  (Bobo)  -0.021 0.003  -0.026 -0.014 -0.006 0.245  0.210  Yes 
  (0.286) (0.474) (0.239) (0.714) (1.000)      
Nord-Ouest -0.111 -0.124 0.017  -0.017 -0.065 0.054  0.022  Yes 
  (0.378) (0.284) (0.338) (0.622) (1.000)      
Sahel  -0.088 -0.066 0.075  0.049  -0.037 0.010  0.006  No 
  (0.237) (0.344) (0.420) (0.763) (1.000)      
Est  -0.147 -0.086 -0.042 -0.051 -0.047 0.024  0.019  No 
  (0.164) (0.516) (0.319) (0.836) (1.000)      
Sud-Ouest
 a)  0.101  -0.134 0.079  -0.114 -0.060 0.006  0.004  Yes 
  (0.257) (0.450) (0.293) (0.743) (1.000)      
Centre-Nord  0.082 0.075 -0.088  0.019 0.061 0.029  0.029  No 
  (0.341) (0.423) (0.236) (0.659) (1.000)      
Centre-Ouest  0.019  -0.122 0.048  -0.015 -0.019 0.065  0.055  No 
  (0.339) (0.250) (0.411) (0.661) (1.000)      
Centre  (Ouaga)  -0.011  0.038 -0.026  0.022 0.015 0.492  0.596  No 
  (0.228) (0.546) (0.226) (0.772) (1.000)      
Nord  -0.014  0.034 0.034 0.068 0.035 0.037  0.024  No 
  (0.361) (0.373) (0.266) (0.639) (1.000)      
Centre-Est -0.013  0.149 -0.062  0.039 0.079 0.039  0.034  No 
  (0.140) (0.610) (0.249) (0.860) (1.000)      
β (gr-gr)
b)    0.178 0.022 -0.273  0.588    
ϕ1 (gr-gr)
c)    0.219 0.016 -0.185  0.378    
ϕ2 (gr-lev)
d) 0.089 0.234 0.431 0.303 0.005    
            
 
Notes: 
a) The numbers for the region ‘Sud-Ouest’ should be taken with caution, because they rely on only 
20 households. 
b) β is the regression coefficient between the growth rate of informal income and the growth 
rate of the other income sources, i.e. a coefficient of 0.04 indicates that one percentage point more growth 
of formal income per capita is linked with 0.04 points more growth of informal income. 
c) ϕ1 indicates the 
correlation coefficient between the growth rate of informal income and the growth rate of the other income 
sources. 
d) ϕ2 indicates the correlation coefficient between the growth rate of informal income and the initial 
level of the different income sources. 
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; computations by the authors.   28
Table 5 
Occupational choice of urban second order labour income earners 
Multinominal logit model 
Dependent variable  Informal sector wage earner  Formal sector wage earner 
occupational choice  1994  1998  2003  1994  1998  2003 
          
Age 0.182***  0.184***  0.221*** 0.327*** 0.402***  0.467*** 
Squared Age  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005***  -0.006*** 
Female -0.765***  -0.530***  -0.613*** -1.050*** -1.760***  -1.372*** 
Highest education level              
 No  schooling  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Some  primary  educ  0.795***  0.806*** 0.101  1.051*** 1.327***  0.516*** 
 Primary  compl  0.348***  0.789*** -0.097  0.929*** 1.378***  0.788*** 
  Some or compl low 
sec 0.071  0.647***  -1.145*** 1.570***  1.741***  0.219*** 
  Some or compl high 
sec 0.176  0.428  -2.057***  2.467*** 2.593***  0.617*** 
 Technical  educ  0.158  0.509  -1.235*** 2.475***  2.150***  1.010*** 
          
HH head labour income             
 Informal  earnings  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Formal  earnings  -0.596***  -0.691*** -0.785*** 0.367***  0.285**  0.417*** 
  Log monthly earnings 
(Head) -0.125***  -0.176***  -0.145*** 0.145***  0.197***  0.112** 
          
No. of observations  5233  4711 5540 5233 4711  5540 
Pseudo R Square  0.169 0.214  0.224  0.169 0.214  0.224 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively; the model 
only includes individuals, which are not specified as household heads, i.e. individuals not 
accounting for the main labour earning of a household; besides the variables noted in the table, 
the model includes the following explicative variable: city, household size, per cent of occupied 
household members (without accounting for the individual itself) and transfers received.  
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; estimations by the authors.   29
Table 6 
Occupational choice of urban population, secondary household members only 
Selection model (Full MLE) 
Dependent variable  1994 1998 2003 
binary informal = 1 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
       
Heckman probit model: informal = 1, formal = 0      
Age -0.110***  -0.051**  -0.096***  -0.105***  -0.082***  -0.094*** 
Squared  Age  0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 
Female  0.560***  0.242*** 0.723*** 0.813*** 0.453***  0.528*** 
Highest education level                
  No  schooling  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
  Some primary educ  -0.289***  -0.105  -0.369***  -0.271**  -0.349***  -0.114 
  Primary  compl  -0.550***  -0.312*** -0.555*** -0.318*** -0.670***  -0.431*** 
  Some or compl low sec  -1.111***  -0.837*** -1.036*** -0.623*** -0.888***  -0.565*** 
  Some or compl high sec  -1.733***  -1.445*** -1.784*** -1.362*** -1.830***  -1.522*** 
  Technical  educ  -1.898***  -1.454*** -1.609*** -1.089*** -1.689***  -1.282*** 
          
HH head labour income             
  Informal  earnings    Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Formal  earnings    -0.579***    -0.521***    -0.715*** 
  Log monthly earnings 





Second order labour income  0.964***    0.749***    0.548***   
          
Selection model: probability of being occupied       
Age 0.117***  0.105**  0.124***  0.111***  0.138***  0.151*** 
Squared  Age  -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.002*** 
Female  -0.625***  -0.489*** -0.639*** -0.476*** -0.616***  -0.500*** 
Highest education level              
  No  schooling  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
  Some primary educ  0.445***  0.516**  0.490***  0.520***  0.023  0.101 
  Primary  compl  0.237***  0.300*** 0.462*** 0.542*** -0.054  0.015 
  Some or compl low sec  0.240***  0.325***  0.473***  0.586***  -0.549***  -0.514*** 
  Some or compl high sec  0.526***  0.775**  0.644***  0.915***  -0.550***  -0.438*** 
  Technical  educ  0.575***  0.691*** 0.460*** 0.692*** -0.168  -0.182 
          
HH head labour income             
  Informal  earnings    Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Formal  earnings    -0.266***    -0.305***    -0.291*** 
  Log monthly earnings 
(Head)   -0.039***    -0.073***   -0.072*** 







          
rho
a)  -0.462*** -0.022  -0.732***  -0.243  -0.347*** -0.100 
          
No. of observations  9971  5233 8791 4711 8928  5540 
No. of non-censored 
estimations 
5411  1915 5145 1884 5210  2595 
Log-likelihood   6641  3588 6003 3267 6469  4056 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively. The dependent 
variable in the selection model distinguishes between occupied = 1 or inactive = 0 and the dependent 
variable in the Heckman probit model distinguishes between occupied in the informal sector = 1, and 
occupied in the formal sector = 0. Col. (1) total urban labour force; Col. (2) including only those individuals 
which are not specified as household heads, i.e. individuals not accounting for the main labour earning of a 
household. Besides the variables noted in the table, the model includes the following explicative variable: 
city, and the following explanatory variables: age and sex composition of the household, per cent of 
occupied household members (without accounting for the individual itself) and transfers received. 
a)rho is 
the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the probit model and the selection function.  
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; estimations by the authors.   30
Table 7 
Estimation of urban monthly earning functions 
Total urban labour force, Selection model (Full MLE) 
Dependent variable  1994  1998  2003 
log monthly earnings  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) (1)  (2) 
          
Age 0.079***  0.096***  0.029*** 0.048*** 0.061***  0.031 
Squared Age  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001***  0.000** 
Female -0.632***  -0.583***  -0.524*** -0.785*** -0.439***  -0.655*** 
Highest education level              
 No  schooling  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Some  primary  educ  0.109  0.189 -0.073  -0.031  0.206***  0.220** 
 Primary  compl  0.477***  0.405*** 0.208**  0.190  0.211***  0.159* 
  Some or compl low sec  0.830***  0.829*** 0.455*** 0.546*** 0.419***  0.258** 
  Some or compl high sec  1.522***  1.933*** 0.895*** 1.142*** 1.038***  0.585*** 
 Technical  educ  1.300***  1.716*** 0.874*** 0.774*** 1.078***  1.008*** 
Sector          
 Primary  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Secondary  0.464***  0.771*** 1.406*** 1.617*** 0.985***  1.049*** 
 Tertiary  0.354***  0.562*** 1.496*** 1.885*** 1.110***  1.211*** 
 Admin  0.718***  1.523*** 1.756*** 2.046*** 1.241***  1.009*** 
Informal Sector  Ref.    Ref.    Ref.   
Formal Sector  0.498***    0.199***    0.078***   
          
Second order labour income 
(Dummy) -0.582***  -1.584***  -0.066 -0.901***  -0.563***  -0.643*** 
          
Intercept 8.368***  7.512***  8.533*** 7.893*** 8.140***  9.129*** 
rho
a) -0.021  0.732***  -0.456*** 0.189  -0.042  -0.102 
          
No. of observations  9950  4002  8789  3646  8927  3621 
No. of non-censored 
estimations 
2919  1590 2952 1518 3354  1903 
Log-likelihood  8331  4546 7649 4053 8171  4363 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively; Col. (1) total 
urban labour force; Col. (2) informal urban labour force, only. Besides the variables noted in the 
table, the model includes the following explicative variable: City. As explanatory variables in 
the selection function we use variables for the age and sex composition of the household, for 
the age, sex, education and household position of the individual, for per cent of occupied 
household members (without accounting for the individual itself) and for transfers received. rho
a) 
is the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the earnings regression and the selection 
function. 
 
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; computations by the authors.   31
Table 8 
Estimation of urban monthly earning functions 
Secondary household labour earnings only, selection model (Full MLE) 
Dependent variable  1994  1998  2003 
log monthly earnings  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) (1)  (2) 
           
Age 0.089***  0.015  0.131***  -0.061*** 0.098***  -0.065*** 
Squared Age  -0.001***  0.000**  -0.002*** 0.001***  -0.001***  0.001** 
Female -0.516***  -0.917***  -0.168*** -1.206*** -0.344***  -0.792*** 
Highest education achieved             
 No  schooling  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Some  primary  0.076  -0.042 0.108  -0.191 0.113  0.157 
 Completed  primary  0.356***  0.368** 0.273***  0.161 0.137  0.234 
  Some or compl. junior high  0.870*** 0.468**  0.385*** 0.232  0.206***  0.085 
  Some or compl. senior high  1.627*** 1.516***  0.794***  0.484 0.734***  -0.027 
 Technical  1.418***  1.638*** 0.628*** 0.147  0.746***  0.795 
Informal  Sector  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Formal Sector  0.635***    0.370***    0.429***   
HH head labour income             
 Informal  income  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
 Formal  income  0.023  -0.373*** -0.504*** -1.019*** 0.103  -0.529*** 
  Log monthly earnings 
(Head) 0.324***  0.311***  0.570*** 0.603*** 0.431***  0.516*** 
           
Intercept 3.886***  7.467***  7.926*** 7..586***  2.836***  7.816*** 
rho
a) 0.430  -0.374  -0.957***  -0.902*** 0.190  -0.919*** 
           
No. of observations  7263  2702  6203  2371  6338  2312 
No. of non-censored 
estimations 
944 639  920  536  1167  704 
Log-likelihood 3913  2127  3409  1652  4082  2091 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively; the model 
only includes individuals, which are not specified as household heads, i.e. individuals not 
accounting for the main labour earning of a household; Col. (1) total urban labour force; Col. (2) 
informal urban labour force, only. Besides the variables noted in the table, the model includes 
the following explicative variable: city and sector employment. As explanatory variables in the 
selection function we use variables for the age and sex composition of the household, for the 
age, sex and education of the individual, for per cent of occupied household members (without 
accounting for the individual itself), for the sector employment of the household head and for 
transfers received. rho
a) is the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the earnings 
regression and the selection function.  
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; estimations by the authors.   32
Table 9 
Household labour sector dependence, in percentages 
(urban population older than 14 years) 
  1994 1998 2003 
     
(1) HH main labour income 
   Public  wage  23.4  21.1  19.7 
    Private formal wage  19.5  20.8  21.2 
   Informal  earnings  49.9  45.6  56.2 
(2) HH labour structure        
    Formal earnings only  19.4  22.5  20.0 
    Informal earnings only  53.8  52.7  54.5 
    Formal and informal earnings  26.8  24.8  25.6 
     
 
Notes: (1) percentage of urban population living in households where the main (highest) labour 
income comes from the respective sector. (2) percentage of population living in households with 
only formal, only informal and ‘mixed’ sector income.  
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; computations by the authors. 
 
Table 10 
Estimation of per capita household expenditure functions 
Urban areas only, OLS 
Dependent variable  1994  1998  2003 
log per capita HH expenditure  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
        
Percentage of active HH 
members 0.554***  0.710***  0.348*** 0.625*** 0.281*** 0.422*** 
HH-size -0.133***  -0.135***  -0.220*** -0.198*** -0.150*** -0.156*** 
Transfers received (Dummy)  0.123*** 0.169*** 0.033  0.140*** 0.077**  0.168*** 
        
HH  labour  structure        
  Per cent of formal workers to 
all workers  0.807*** 0.311*** 0.628*** 0.288*** 0.166*** 0.317*** 
HH head labour earnings             
Non-labour income  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
 Informal  income  0.089    0.000    -0.291*   
 Formal  income  0.114    0.025    0.195*   
  Log monthly earnings (Head)    0.259***    0.326***    0.392*** 
        
Intercept 11.507***  9.211***  11.786*** 8.609***  11.990*** 7.918*** 
        
No. of observations  2485 2485 2428 2428 2398 2398 
Adjusted R Square  0.331 0.429 0.313 0.472 0.299 0.477 
 
Notes: *, **, *** coefficient significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively; besides the 
variables noted in the table, the model includes the following explicative variable: city and age 
and sex composition of the household  
Source: EPI, EPII and EPIII; estimations by the authors. 